As mentioned earlier, the first concern was that KGB spies had not been prosecuted for their crimes. The authorities had known about the spies for a considerable time, but had chosen not to prosecute them. It also appeared that the decision not to prosecute had been taken without reference to the prosecuting authorities. The Mitrokhin Archive listed a number of UK spies only by their KGB code-names, except when there had been a successful prosecution or it was public knowledge in which case the book identified them by name. However, the book confirmed for the first time that Mrs Melita Norwood, code-named HOLA, and John Symonds, code-named SCOT, were KGB spies. Neither of these two met these criteria.

The Committee decided to examine the formal procedures of both the SIS and the Security Service for handling information and what actually happened in the cases of Mrs Norwood and Mr Symonds. The evidence given to the Committee and its conclusions are detailed below, with the detailed information contained in Annexes F, G and H.

The Security Service's evidence states that Mrs Norwood, HOLA, was an important UK case identified by Mr Mitrokhin's material. During 1992 and the first months of 1993 there was a clear understanding that Mr Mitrokhin's material needed to be subject to restrictive handling procedures to protect Mr Mitrokhin's security and the international handling of leads to still active spies. The Security Service felt unable to interview Mrs Norwood at this time because of these sensitivities. Later in 1993, when the sensitivities were less, the Service reviewed Mrs Norwood's case internally. They came to the conclusion that police action was inappropriate, given the age of Mrs Norwood and the passage of time since her espionage activities. However they did not consult the Law Officers on whether further action was appropriate with a view to prosecuting Mrs Norwood.

The Security Service denied that any decision was taken then not to prosecute Mrs Norwood. However, the Committee believes that a member of staff, to all intents and purposes, took the decision. By deciding not to interview Mrs Norwood at this time and making no attempt to gain evidence that would support a prosecution effectively prevented her possible prosecution. The then Director General of the Security Service, Dame Stella Rimington, cannot remember ever being briefed about Mrs Norwood. This supports the view that the decision was not taken at senior level.

The Security Service told the Committee that Mrs Norwood's case ''slipped out of sight'' until her name appeared in the draft book being written by Professor Andrew. In March 1999 the Security Service asked the Law Officers whether action could be taken with a view to prosecuting Mrs Norwood under the Official Secrets Act.

The Attorney General, Rt. Hon. John Morris, as he then was, responded by stating that there was no decision for him to make. In his evidence Sir John Morris explained that this meant that as a court would judge any prosecution an abuse of process, it was not necessary for him to give a view on whether further action against Mrs Norwood was appropriate. The Committee was told that a court would regard the prosecution as an abuse of process because the authorities had known about Mrs Norwood's espionage actives for a considerable time and had not taken action earlier. Consequently, he did not consider the evidential and public interest issues. On the basis of this answer from Sir John Morris, the Security Service then decided to take no further action against Mrs Norwood.

The Home Secretary, Jack Straw, during evidence to the Committee, questioned the Security Service decision. The interdepartmental working group agreed in July 1999 that the Home Secretary should be consulted by the Service on whether Mrs Norwood should be interviewed before the journalist David Rose approached her. This course of action, which had been agreed by the Security Service representative on the group, was subsequently overturned during a conversation with an official in the Home Office, who had not attended the meeting. The Home Secretary stated during his evidence that he wished he had been consulted. The Director General of the Security Service, Mr Stephen Lander, stated that the decision to interview Mrs Norwood was an operational matter, and therefore it was for him to make and not the Home Secretary. Mr Lander stated that he believed that the Service would gain nothing from such an interview. The Committee recognises that any admissions made by Mrs Norwood in interview would not have been admissible in evidence against her unless they had been made under caution.

In the Committee's opinion the submission sent by the Security Service to the Legal Secretariat for the Law Officers was written to gain endorsement for the Service's earlier 'decision' not to take any action against Mrs Norwood. Witnesses have stated that decisions on prosecutions are based on evidential grounds and that public interest considerations are only taken into account if there is sufficient evidence to support a prosecution. The Security Service's submission stated that in 1992/93 public interest reasons - the age of Mrs Norwood and the fact that the offences were committed 50 years ago - were reasons why it was considered that police action was inappropriate. The submission also stated that there was a lack of evidence.

The Committee believes that it was a serious failure of the Security Service not to refer Mrs Norwood's case to the Law Officers in mid 1993. This failure to consult the Law Officers resulted in the decision whether or not to prosecute Mrs Norwood effectively being taken by the Security Service. The Committee is concerned that the Service used public interest reasons to justify taking no further action against Mrs Norwood, when this was for the Law Officers to decide. We also believe that the failure of the Security Service to interview Mrs Norwood at this time prevented her possible prosecution.

The Committee is concerned that Mrs Norwood's case ''slipped out of sight'' between 1993 and 1998. The Committee believes that Mrs Norwood's case should have been kept under review during this period. This was a further serious failure by the Security Service.

We are concerned that it took over three months to consult the Law Officers after the Home Secretary was told in 1998 that the Law Officers were being consulted. The Committee also questions the basis on which the Security Service took the decision not to interview Mrs Norwood prior to her name being made public by the BBC. We believe that the Service could have interviewed Mrs Norwood, at least for the intelligence and historical record.

The Committee discovered that the Security Service only contacted the Law Officers on 9 September 1999 to see if Mr Symonds, SCOT, could be prosecuted. This was despite the fact that they had known for a considerable time that Mr Symonds would be included and named in The Mitrokhin Archive. Mr Symonds was mentioned in the 10 March 1999 letter to the Law Officers on Mrs Norwood, but no opinion on whether Mr Symonds should be prosecuted was sought. In their evidence, the Security Service stated that they had followed up the allegations made by Mr Symonds in 1985. At that time, the Service had recorded that the Director of Public Prosecutions had given Mr Symonds immunity from prosecution for all crimes but serious offences of violence prior to his disclosure of his alleged KGB exploits. This immunity had been given in the context of police corruption enquiries.

When the Security Service received the information on Mr Symonds from Mr Mitrokhin's material they investigated the case. They interviewed people with whom Mr Symonds had made contact and concluded that no information had been compromised. However, the Security Service never interviewed Mr Symonds. On 20 December 1999 the Solicitor General announced that no action would be brought against Mr Symonds, on the grounds that he had previous immunity from prosecution.

The Committee believes that it was a serious failure of the Security Service not to refer Mr Symonds' case to the Law Officers in mid 1993. We are concerned that it took over 9 months to consult the Law Officers after he was identified in the draft book. We believe that the Service could have interviewed Mr Symonds, at least for the intelligence and historical record.

The Committee was told in evidence that steps have now been taken to ensure that these mistakes do not occur again. Whilst criteria exist for prosecutions, the Security Service has agreed to send all material relevant to prosecutions to the Legal Secretariat to the Law Officers on a trial basis for 12 months. This will allow the Law Officers to assess when a prosecution is possible for all cases and validate these criteria for future use. The correspondence is also copied to the Legal Advisor at the Home Office for information.

To prevent any cases and leads not being followed up, the Director General has employed a retired member of staff to check every historical case to ensure that they have all been correctly investigated. Additionally, the Home Secretary has agreed with the Director General that all current cases will be reviewed annually and their status reported to him.